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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JERRY ARTHUR 'VI-IITE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs 
NICOLE EDITH 'VHITE, 
Def end ant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12960 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE . GASE 
This is an action for divorce wherein each of the 
parties sought a decree of divorce and custody of the 
minor child of the parties, Nicolette. Defendant-appel-
lant also sought child support and an award of attorney's 
fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The District Court with the Honorable :Merrill C. 
Faux, .T udge, presiding, awarded plaintiff-respondent 
a decree of divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty, in 
that the defendant had excluded the plaintiff from her 
activities and had company with other men, and awarded 
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to the plaintiff-respondent the care, custody and control 
of the minor chilcl of the parties on the grounds that it 
would not he in the best interests of the minor child to 
be placed in the custody of the defendant-appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that this Court should affirm 
the decree of divorce as entered by the District Court 
that the divorce was awarded to the plaintiff-respondent 
together with the care, custody and control of the minor 
child. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and respondent were inter-married on 
.Tune 13, 1969, in the State of California. A female 
child. Nicolette, was born to the parties l<'ebruary 23, 
1968 ( R-1) . Prior to the commencement of the college 
year, 1969, the parties moved to Salt Lake City, and 
established a matrimonial domicile. The parties resided 
together as husband and wife until the Summer of 1971, 
when appellant journeyed to San Francisco, to attend 
gardnate school and obtain her master's degree. Dur-
ing the time she was attending school in San l<-,rancisco, 
she had used some drugs (R-83 thru 86) and had inter-
course with a professor at San Francisco State College 
(R-82) (R-138-139). 
Thereafter, on or about the 25th day of July, 1971, 
the respondent brought the minor child of the parties 
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to reside with him in Salt Lake City, and on or about 
the 10th of August, 1971, the complaint was filed com-
mencing this action (R-lp7). In the interim appellant 
·went to a "gestalt" workshop at Esalan, and had 
another chance to engage in an act of infidelity (H-73 
thru 79) an<l, in fact, admitted intercourse with another 
man (R-78). 
Trial was held before the Honorable l\IeITill C. 
Faux, .Judge, on April 25th, and 26th, 1972, and there-
after on l\Iay 26th, 1972, the Court entered its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and decree of divorce 
awar<ling the respondent the decree of divorce and the 
care, custody and control of the minor child of the par-
ties, }\f icolette. 
The trial court found that the appellant had ex-
cluded the respondent from her activities by keeping 
company with other men (R-53-54) and that she had 
conclucted her personal life in such a manner that it 
would he in the best interests of the minor child to award 
custody of the minor child to the plaintiff. The Court 
found that the defendant had engaged in several extra-
marital relationships, that she had put the attention and 
acclaim of other men ahead of her marriage and her 
minor child, and that she had kept company and slept 
with other men while the minor child was present ( R-54). 
The transcript of the trial is replete with testimony 
of the appellant herself concerning her infidelity and 
infidclity while the minor child, Nicolette, was present 
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(R-G.5-66-70-71-72-73-74-78-79-81). Further, the recor<l 
clearly shows that the appellant was overly concerned 
with her e<lucation (R-90-101-110-121-122). 
After the commencement of this action the parties 
attempted a reconciliation, but separated again on or 
ahout October 1, rn71 (R-69). On Thanksgiving Day 
of 1!>71, the respondent found appellant engaged in 
sexual intercourse at her residence with "~like" with 
' 
the minor chilcl of the parties in the next bedroom. A 
fight ensued between respondent and the other man 
( R-70 thru 7:3 and 118). Thereafter, the appellant took 
the minor child of the parties contrary to the temporary 
order of the parties to the State of California, and ad-
mitted at the time of trial that while there for a perio<l 
of about four weeks lived with another man, to wit: 
~Iike Isscl (ll-65 thru ()7 and 126). The respondent in 
this matter is a young man who has now received his 
master's degree and notwitlistancling the fact that sev-
eral years ago he had hy his own admission engaged in 
the use of marijuana and certain other drugs, he has 
now completely reformed and has not for more than 
a year prior to the commencement of this action used 
any type of drug (R-152-153). Further, he has made 
what the District Court found adequate aITangements 
for caring for the minor child of the parties. The re-
spondent loves the child; they have shown a great deal 
of affection and fondness for each other, and he is a 
good father (R-G9-70). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANT-
ED A DECREE OF DIVORCE TO 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 
'Vhile a divorce in the State of Utah may be 
granted to both parties jointly where both are equally 
at fault, whether one or the other or both should be 
given a decree of divorce should be left to the sound 
discretion of the Court. In 1ll11lli11s 'V8 1llullins. 26 U. 2cl 
82, "t85 P. 2cl <>G3 ( 1971), the Court found grounds for 
dinwce on both sides and stated that it would have 
awarded the dinwce to both parties hut Utah law did 
not allow such a procedure. The trial court awarded the 
dinJl'ce only to the wife. On Heview, the Supreme 
Comt held that Utah law does allow a divorce to be 
granted to both parties where the facts find each of the 
parties equally at fault; however, the Supreme Court 
declined to reverse the trial court even though the de-
cree lJeing grantecl to the wife was based upon misunder-
standing of the law. The Supreme Court held that even 
under these circumstances whether one or the other or 
both should he given a divorce should be left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court based upon the evidence 
adduced, 486 P. 2d at page 664. See also Grazimw vs 
Graziano, 7 U. 2d 181, 321 P. 2d 931 ( 1958). 
The record in the instant case is clear that the ap-
pellant caused the respondent great mental suffering 
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time appellant had the parties' minor child with her 
causing the respondent great concern over the child's 
welfare, to the extent that he has been compelled to go 
to the child's aid to remove her from such circumstances 
(R-1:32 and 72-73). The appe1lant has allowed herself 
to be so attracted by the attentions from other men that 
she has found it difficult to remain true to the respon-
den and this feeling has caused her to spend time and 
attention with other men rather than with the respondent 
and their minor child, and slie has told him so ( R-89 thru 
Ul). 
The appellant has further placed her desire for 
schooling above her marital responsibilities spernling 
time away from home and leaving the matrimonial 
domicile with the pa1ties' child, against respondent's 
wishes to pursue her schooling (R-134-135). Respon-
dent, on the other hand has not been guilty of a single, 
nncondoned act of infidelity. 
Appellant in her brief has alluded to an incident 
which occurred in California, which incident was prior 
to the parties establishing a matrimonial domicile in tl1e 
State of Utah, and hence would not he grounds for 
din>rce on the part of the appellant and "\vhich act of 
infidelity was fully condoned and forgiven by the ap-
pellant . (H-127) .. The appellant attempts to show 
grounds for her divorce being his temper and her being 
afraid of him. He called her "slut" and "bitch" (R-124-
125). I submit that these arc justifiable terms of en·· 
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dcarment when you cateh your wife in bed with another 
man, or when she admits sexual intercourse with other 
men on three or four occa~ions. 
In the Gra;r,iano case, supra, notwithstanding the 
fact that the Court found fault on both sides sufficient 
to a grant a divorce, the Court granted the divorce to 
the wife and the Supreme Court in refusing to reverse 
the trial court held in substance that the Supreme Court 
will not substitute its judgment for the trial courts, un-
less a dear prPponderance of the evidence is against the 
findings and there is no practical good except moral 
,·indication that can be served by reversing and ordering 
a decree for the other party, and that the Court was 
mindful of the propriety of indulging deference to 
the trial court's judgment and should not lightly disturb 
it. 321 P. 2d@ 933 
POINT II 
THIS COURT l\IUST REVIE'V- THE 
RECORD IN A LIGHT l\IOST FA V-
ORAllLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-RE-
SPONDENT. 
A district Court of the State of Utah, sitting as 
a trial court in a divorce action has a great deal of dis-
cretion in a warding divorce and custody of minor child 
and its judgment will not be overtumed except where 
manifest justice is worked on trial court's finding is 
against clear proponderance of the evidence. (Graziano 
vs Graziano, Supra) 
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In TVilson 'l's TVilson, .5 U. 2d 79, 29() P. 2d 977 
( 1956), the Court stated its policy 
" .... That the trial judge has considerable 
latitude of discretion in such matters and that 
his judgment should not be changed lightly, 
and, in fact, not at all unless it worked such 
a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate 
a clear abuse of discretion .... " (Supra at 
page 981) (See also Plue/card vs Anderson, 
8 U. 2d 229, 333 P. 2d 1064 (1959). 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in re-
viewing divorce cases will review both the facts and the 
Jaw. (See Pluclwrd 'L'S Anderson, supra). Nevertheless, 
in making snch review the Court will cmwass the record 
in a light most favorable to the party awarded custody 
hy the trial court (Rowe 'L'S Rowe, 12 U. 2d 291, 36/) 
P.2d ( 19()1) and Sorensen 'L'S Sorensen, 18 U.2d 102, 
417 P. 2d 118 ( 196()) . In reviewing the record in a light 
mo~t favorahle to the respondent there is no doubt as 
to the correctness of the trial court's decision; and fur-
thermore, even viewing it in a light most favorable to 
the appellant does not change any of the facts or alter 
any of the facts of infidelity and certainly should not 
alter the Court's findings. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S 
DISCRETJON IN AvVARDING CUS-
TODY OF THE .MINOR CHILD TO 
RESPONDENT. 
Since the 1969 General Session of the Utah State 
Legislature, the often used presumption that a mother 
is best suited to care for the minor child of the parties 
has been altered, and a new public policy has been d.;>-
clared. At the present time there are several facts that 
must be taken into consideration by the finder of facts 
in addition to this presumption. 
Section ao-3-10, UC.A ( rn.~3, as amended by L. 
1969, Ch 72 S 7) reads in pad as follows: 
" .... in determining custody the Court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the 
past conduct and demo11stratcrl mural standardJJ 
of each of the parties and the natural presump-
tion that the l\Iother is best suited to care for 
the young children .... " (emphasis added) 
Prior to the above quoted amendment to the stat-
ute the presumption was that the Mother was best suited 
to care for the minor children and except in extreme 
cases of unfitness on the part of the l\lother the chil-
tlren would not be taken from her. This clearly is not 
the status of the law at the present time. 
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Respondent would call this Ilonorable Court's at-
tention to the fact that every case cited by the appel-
lant in her brief relative to past conduct an<l moral 
standards of the parties are cases which were decided 
by this Court prior to the 1969 amendment. See Dearden 
'l's Dearden, 15 U. 2d 105, 388 P. 2d 230 (1964); Briggs 
'L'S Briggs, 111 U. 418, 181 P. 2d 223 ( 1947); Stuber 
vs Stuber, 121 U. 632, 244 P. 2d 6.50 (19.52), and IJic· 
Broom vs IJicBroom, 14 U. 2d 393, 384 P. 2d 961 
( 19()3). 
These foregoing cases are clearly not in accord 
with the present Utah law which requires the finder of 
fact to weigh the conduct and the moral standards of 
eaeh of the parties in deciding in what is best for the 
minor children. 
Respondent would submit that the appellant in her 
brief has overstated this old rule and would call the 
Court's attention to Stoel.:.<; vs Stocks, 14 U. 2d 314, 
383 P. 2d 923 ( 1963) , wherein the Court stated: 
"The Rule which favors the :l\Iother is only one 
of many factors which must be considered and 
is applicable only if all things are equal." Id 
at P 924. (emphasis theirs). 
The trial court in this matter after hearing the 
testirn011v of both of the parties after viewing their de-
meanor ~nd manner in Court found that the appellant 
so conducted her personal life that it was repulsive to 
the standards of this community and that her morals are 
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sueh that it would be detrimental to the best interests 
of the minor child to allow the minor child to reside with 
the appellant. The Court further found that because 
of her loose morals aIHl de'sire to he with other men even 
while the minor child was present that these were factors 
which the statute specifically mandated that the Court 
should take into consideration and the Court correctly 
took these matters into consideration and awarded the 
respondent the custody of the minor child. In Stock.fl vs 
Stocks, supra, the Supreme Court stated at page 294: 
"The trial court was in a much hetter position 
to understand and entluate the testimony than. 
we are. The Court has observed the attitudes, 
manners and personalities of the parties and 
has had the opportunity to evaluate the ability 
of the parties and the effect that association 
with these parties will have on the child's life." 
(Citing Smith vs Smith, I U. 2cl 75, 262 P. 2d 
28H ( 1953). 
The whole point in this matter being brought be-
fore this Court is that the trial court found that the 
actions of l\Irs. \Vhite in the presence of the minor 
child, Nicolette, was repulsive to the staIHlards of the 
community and that it would not be in the best interests 
of the minor child to allow her to remain in a situation 
where her ~Iother was more concerned with the atten-
tion she was deriving from other men and where her 
Mother would be living with a man and not her hus-
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hand. I submit to this Court that the trial court was 
correct. If the appellant were to feed and bathe the 
child eYery day and see that she washed her teeth, and 
had dean clothes on her, that would be doing the min-
isterial things that a .l\iother must do; even loving a 
child is not enough. 'Ve must look to the best interests 
of the child and that is exactly what the trial court did. 
CONCJ,USION 
Respondent respectfully submits that this Court 
should affirm the decision of the District Court in 
awarding the respondent the decree of divorce and the 
custody of the minor child, in that there is no prejudi-
eial error that was committed by the District Court in 
either the award of the divorce or the custody of the 
child. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lauren N. Beasley 
COTRO-~IANES, 'V ARR, 
FANKI-IAUSER & BEASLEY 
430 J rnlge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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